Category Archives: US Legislation

All related to US covered bond legislation

Videos

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These are videos from recent covered bond conferences and other events that relate to Canadian or U.S.$ covered bonds.


European Covered Bond Directive • Euromoney

Covered bonds and securitisations are easily confused • Euromoney

TCB Roadshow 2022 | The implications of growth: Canadian covered bonds in 2022 and beyond

Mayer Brown Webinar • 2020
Covered Bonds Update in the United States
Jerry Marlatt and Laura Drumm

US $ covered bonds – back again • Euromoney 2019

Equal treatment for non-EU covered bonds? What’s needed? • Euromoney 2018

Euromoney/ECBC Covered Bond Congress 2018, 13 September 2018 • Munich
Concerns about the Covered Bond Directive.

Euromoney/ECBC Covered Bond Congress 2018, 13 September 2018 • Munich
Outlook for the Canadian covered bond market and prospects for the U.S. market

Euromoney/ECBC Covered Bond Congress 2018, 13 September 2018 • Munich
Impact of MREL and TLAC on covered bond issuance.

Euromoney/ECBC North America Covered Bond Forum, 19 April 2018 • Vancouver
Keynote Address by Sandra Johnson, FHFA

Euromoney/ECBC North America Covered Bond Forum, 19 April 2018 • Vancouver
Interview with Sandra Johnson, FHFA

Euromoney/ECBC North America Covered Bond Forum, 19 April 2018 • Vancouver
Interview with Jerry Marlatt on “What Hope for America”.

Congressman Jeb Hensarling On Covered Bonds • 2010

Congressman Scott Garrett On Covered Bonds • 2010

Garrett Introduces Covered Bonds Amendment • 2010




U.S. Legislation in 2020

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U.S. Legislation in 2020

Where are we with U.S. legislation for covered bonds starting 2020?

First, we are in a highly contentious and partisan presidential election year. A few days ago CNN reported that there was a tie for the most admired person in the United States: Donald Trump and Barak Obama. The division is deep and wide.

Second, the possibility for bi-partisan legislation is not high, but there has been some bi-partisan legislation, even during the impeachment hearings in the House. For example, the amended North America Free Trade Agreement was passed. So there is some possibility of passage of legislation, as there always is even in an election year.

Third, it is unlikely that covered bond legislation will be separated from GSE reform, because GSE reform will inevitably examine housing finance and the role of the government in housing finance. Until that is settled it probably makes little sense to initiate a new form of housing finance in the form of covered bonds.

It seems very unlikely that covered bonds would not be a viable form of housing finance in a post-GSE reform world, but why put the cart before the horse.

That leaves us with the question of the prospects for GSE reform in 2020. The GSEs have now been in conservatorship for more than 10 years. The current situation of the GSEs is obviously acceptable to many sectors. Nevertheless, there remains a desire to resolve the situation and clean up this unfinished business.

In June 2018, the President of the United States released a reform and reorganization plan entitled “Delivering Government Solutions in the 21st Century.” This plan includes a proposal to convert Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into private sector entities, to provide an express government guarantee of mortgage loans to Fannie, Freddie and other qualifying entities, and to restructure financial support for low and moderate income family mortgage loans into the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

In March 2019, the President issued a Presidential Memorandum directing the Secretary of the Treasury to develop a plan to reform housing finance. In September 2019, the Department of the Treasury issued The Treasury Housing Reform Plan. While the Plan provides many specifics for the resolution of the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, much of the Plan is dependent on enabling legislation, the prospects for which appear rather bleak in this strained political environment. As part of the plan, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as Conservator of Fannie and Freddie, exercised its administrative power in the fall of 2019 to permit the GSEs to retain their profits and begin rebuilding their capital as an initial step to resolving the conservatorships. This step increases the pressure on Democrats in Congress to agree to a resolution of Fannie and Freddie.

In 2020, we may see additional administrative action from FHFA that will increase pressure on the Democrats to come to the table on GSE reform. Democrats will be reluctant however to agree to any significantly undesirable changes to the GSEs while there exists a fair prospect for taking over the White House this year and taking more control of GSE reform. Accordingly, we are most likely waiting until 2021 to see any real movement in GSE reform.

Why is CB legislation tied to GSE reform?

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Why is the adoption of covered bond legislation linked to housing finance reform? Housing finance reform is all about the role of the GSEs. While covered bonds certainly can be used to finance residential mortgage loans, they do not require any form of government support. The consideration of the proper role of the government in housing finance can occur independent of covered bonds. However, I hear from many sources that covered bond legislation would only be considered after GSE reform had been adopted or perhaps considered with GSE reform.

There is no apparent logic to this position. Covered bonds are a private sector financing technique that has proved very effective in other jurisdictions. There is nothing in GSE reform that would be a necessary predicate to the issuance of covered bonds by U.S. banks. Covered bond legislation would not touch the status of the GSEs. It is possible that covered bond issuance by U.S. banks could develop into an attractive alternative to financing through the GSE and thus reduce the tension in GSE reform, but that would be beneficial to GSE reform.

It seems as though both sides are determined to keep as much pressure on GSE reform as possible in order to achieve their objectives and not permit any private sector initiatives to sidetrack the discussion until the role of the government in housing finance has been solved. But this seems to put the cart before the horse. Shouldn’t the government intervene only where the private sector is not functioning properly? Wouldn’t it make sense to let private sector initiatives develop first before assigning the government a role? If we can agree that the answer to those two questions is yes, why not adopt covered bond legislation and see how the market develops while we debate how to wind down the GSEs and what would be the appropriate future structure for the government’s role in housing finance?

Certainly we can have a fulsome debate on how the government can support housing access for those who need assistance independent of how covered bond legislation is drafted. Certainly if covered bonds, RMBS and the federal home loan banks fail to provide adequate private sector funding for residential mortgage loans there may be a need to consider a larger government role.

It is not essential that covered bonds be enabled through legislation as it is possible to achieve covered bond issuance through securitization techniques, as has been done in other countries. See, e.g., Time for a US alternative. However, investors will have more confidence in a covered bond sector established through legislation and the market may be expected to develop quicker with legislation. Enacting legislation for covered bonds would be a low cost experiment that would have no harmful side effects. Covered bond legislation, therefor, should be enacted before GSE reform is attempted so that we have a better chance to assess what works in the private sector before designing the government’s role in housing finance.

Why not covered bonds?

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Why not covered bonds?

Why not pass legislation for covered bonds in the United States? It is easy to do and there is basically no cost to the Treasury. In 2011, covered bond legislation passed the House Financial Services Committee by a vote of 44 to 7, a very strong bi-partisan vote. The only dissenters were hoping to implement provisions requested by the FDIC that were rejected by the majority. The dissenters were unable to retain even members from their own party on the final vote. Probably more than any other development, this demonstrates that covered bonds are not a partisan concept, they are not divisive and they have broad support.

Covered bonds will bring private funding to residential mortgage loans, but there is no good reason that passage of covered bond legislation should be tied to GSE reform. There is nothing about covered bonds that would implicate GSE reform, except that by bringing private funding to the market they could reduce the dominate role of the GSEs. And there is no credible evidence that either party in Congress believes that a continued dominate role for the GSEs is a policy mandate.

An unlike securitization of residential mortgage loans, no concerted effort is needed to get investors to participate. Investors are wary of residential mortgage securitization as a result of the financial crisis, which was precipitated by mortgage securitization. There are many efforts underway to convince investors to return to the RMBS market. Covered bonds carry no such baggage. Covered bonds have been readily sold to U.S. markets since 2010 and investors remain eager for more.

Covered bonds are more transparent to regulators.

Covered bonds are a simpler investment analysis for investors.

Covered bonds are proven financing technology with worldwide acceptance.

Covered bonds are friendlier to mortgage borrowers because the originator retains the right to modify loans to assist borrowers in working out difficult loans.

What’s to lose? Maybe covered bonds could develop into a vibrant private sector funding alternative for residential mortgage loans. If not, no loss. And no cost. But if it works, it’s a plus all around.

Use CBs to Restart the PLS Market

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In the United States there is a lot of discussion about how to reduce the taxpayers’ exposure to housing finance. The conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were a pointed reminder of the extent of the government’s, and the taxpayers’, role in housing finance. Additionally, after being taken into conservatorship, the GSEs were intentionally used to prevent a feared collapse of the housing market, further expanding their role.

As a result, the GSEs, together with FHA and GNMA, at one point provided more than 95% of the financing for new residential mortgage loans, and today they still finance roughly nine out of every ten new mortgage loans.  At the same time, the private label securities (PLS) market, which provided significant private funding for residential mortgage loans, essentially vanished.  The issuance of new PLS declined nearly 99% in the years following the crisis.

Today there is general agreement across the political spectrum that it would be desirable to restore some level of private funding for residential mortgage loans and reduce the role of the GSEs.  There are also plans to reform the GSEs and refine their mission in housing finance.  There is less agreement on the reform proposals.

On June 27, 2014, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew requested comment on what steps could be take to restore a functioning PLS market.  Almost uniformly the commenters voiced the need to shrink the presence of Fannie and Freddie in the market in order to make room for a PLS market.  This reflected the view that under the existing authority of the GSEs, the private market would not be price competitive and would only be able to finance a small number of loans that did not qualify for financing through the GSEs under their very high loan limits.

However, the presence of the GSEs is not the only factor impeding the development of the PLS market.  The regulatory landscape for securitizing mortgage loans has been altered dramatically since the crisis.  Basel III imposes heavy, in some cases almost punitive, increased capital requirements on banks and most particularly for securitization exposures held by banks.  The risk weighting for securitization exposures can range up to 1250% and in some cases, such as non-cash gain on sale, the capital requirements will result in a deduction from Tier 1 equity capital.  Rulemaking by the Consumer Financial Protection Board exposes any holder of a mortgage loans to severe penalties for those loans not underwritten in accordance with the CFPB underwriting criteria, which are designed to protect the borrower.  SEC requirements for mortgage securitization require 270 data points of information to be disclosed for every mortgage loan in a securitization, both at the time of the offering and in periodic reporting for the life of the securitization.  Then there is risk retention, prohibited conflicts of interest, margin requirements for swaps, the Volcker Rule, conflicting requirements in foreign securities markets and a litany of other burdens on the PLS market.

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Comment Letter to Treasury on Restoring PLS Market

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On August 8, Morrison & Foerster LLP filed a comment letter with the United States Department of the Treasury in response to a request for comments on the private sector development of a well-functioning private label securities (PLS) market for residential mortgage loans. The comment letter notes that perhaps the easiest way to restore private funding to residential mortgage loans in the United States is to implement a covered bond statute in the United States to enable U.S. banks to issue covered bonds. The letter notes that the conditions necessary to the establishment of a covered bod market in the United States are well advanced and that the market could be established quickly. Based on the development of the investor base in the United States, the SEC’s establishment of disclosure and reporting standards, and the well-developed legislation, creation of a domestic covered bond market would appear to be low hanging fruit that Treasury should take advantage of.

Treasury trying to encourage private funding

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Speaking in Washington on June 26 before the Making Homes Affordable Five Year Anniversary Summit, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Jacob Lew, gave a speech in which he addressed the need for housing finance reform. He also noted almost a complete absence of a private label securities market almost six years after the crisis and a need to restore private funding to the residential mortgage market. He noted that a series of questions was posted to the Treasury website seeking comment by August 8, 2014 on recommendations for reviving the private label securities market.

Neither Secretary Lew’s speech nor the posted questions mention covered bonds. Clearly covered bond legislation for the United States should be considered by the Treasury. The legislation introduced in 2011 by Representative Garrett, H.R. 940, passed the House Financial Services Committee by a very strong bi-partisan vote of 44-7. Passage of covered bond legislation should be easily achievable with Treasury backing and covered bonds could provide an important channel of private funding for the mortgage market. After all, covered bonds provide funding for about €3 trillion in the European market and the domestic U.S. market for covered bonds issued by foreign has shown healthy growth.

Johnson-Crapo Amendment to S. 1217

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On Sunday, March 16, 2014, the Senate Banking Committee released a draft of an Amendment to S. 1217, which is the housing finance reform bill introduced last year by Committee members Mark Warner (D-VA) and Bob Corker (R-TN) to shut down FNMA and FHLMC and establish a new federal role for housing finance.  The amendment released by the Committee is authored by Committee Chairman Timothy Johnson (D-SD) and Ranking Member Michael Crapo (R-ID).  The amendment is introduced following a series of hearings held by the Committee last fall on S. 1217.  Most significantly, the amendment continues to provide for the establishment of the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation and the elimination of FNMA and FHLMC.

The general view is that S. 1217 is likely to be the basis of any bill adopted to reform housing finance.  Unfortunately for covered bonds, there is nothing in the amendment, and nothing in the original bill, to establish a statutory covered bond regime in the United States.  Accordingly, any hope for including covered bond provisions in the bill apparently rests with the House including such provisions in any final bill through the conference committee process.

However, a strong majority of those present at a panel on housing finance reform at the SFIG conference this year in Las Vegas do not expect housing reform legislation to be enacted before 2017.  The best prospects then for covered bond legislation in the near future probably lie elsewhere.